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Understanding the drivers for spread of SARS-CoV-2 in higher education settings is important to limit
transmission between students, and onward spread into at-risk populations. In this study, we
prospectively sequenced 482 SARS-CoV-2 isolates derived from asymptomatic student screening and
symptomatic testing of students and staff at the University of Cambridge from 5 October to 6 December
2020. We performed a detailed phylogenetic comparison with 972 isolates from the surrounding
community, complemented with epidemiological and contact tracing data, to determine transmission
dynamics. After a limited number of viral introductions into the university, the majority of student cases
were linked to a single genetic cluster, likely dispersed across the university following social gatherings at
a venue outside the university. We identi ed considerable onward transmission associated with student
accommodation and courses; this was effectively contained using local infection control measures and
dramatically reduced following a national lockdown. We observed that transmission clusters were largely
segregated within the university or within the community. This study highlights key determinants of
SARS-CoV-2 transmission and effective interventions in a higher education setting that will inform public
health policy during pandemics.
Main
The SARS-CoV-2 pandemic has caused substantial morbidity and mortality globally1,2. Universities have
been considered conduits for transmission due to extensive social networks of young adults, many of
whom live communally, and in-person teaching of large groups3. Outbreaks of SARS-CoV-2 have been
observed in a number of higher education institutions, but the drivers for transmission in these settings
are poorly understood4. It is speculated that infection dynamics are dependent on transmission chains
involving student courses, residence, study year and social networks5. Understanding these dynamics is
essential in order to devise effective infection control measures while minimising disruption to teaching,
research and the mental health of students and staff6. Furthermore, while university students are less
likely to develop severe illness secondary to SARS-CoV-2, there is concern that university outbreaks could
seed infections in more vulnerable populations, including staff, the local community, and upon returning
home to older relatives7. Identifying possible sources of cross-transmission is therefore vital.
Although SARS-CoV-2 genome sequencing has clear utility to identify virus emergence and cryptic
transmission8,9, no large-scale genomic studies in university settings have been conducted. The United
Kingdom has an extensive community genomics surveillance programme through COG-UK10 which
complements traditional contact tracing approaches by providing understanding of circulating viral
populations.
We report the results of a genomic epidemiology study of SARS-CoV-2 across a complete term at the
University of Cambridge (UoC). From 5th October to 6th December 2020, the UoC ran PCR-based
symptomatic testing for all staff and students, and offered asymptomatic screening to 15,500 students
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living in university-managed accommodation. We therefore provide a unique study of SARS-CoV-2
infection that encompasses pre-symptomatic and asymptomatic students11. Positive samples from the
UoC were sequenced and compared with systematic surveillance SARS-CoV-2 sequences from the local
community. The results were analysed in conjunction with epidemiological data derived from the
screening programme and national contact tracing. Overall, we describe introductions of SARS-CoV-2 into
a higher education setting, the dynamics of transmission both within the university and between the
university and the surrounding community, and the impact of local and national measures to control the
spread of SARS-CoV-2 infections.
Results
In total, 972 SARS-CoV-2 cases were identi ed among university students and staff over the course of
term (5th October to 6th December 2020). High-quality genomes were recovered from 446/778 (57.3%)
positive cases from the university testing programme. High-quality genomes were recovered from
107/266 (40.2%) cases identi ed through the Healthcare worker (HCW) screening programme (95 HCWs,
8 students, 4 university staff) and 104 patients identi ed by hospital testing (71 SARS-CoV-2 positive
patients from Cambridge University Hospitals (CUH) and 33 from other medical facilities in
Cambridgeshire). A further 797 local cases identi ed by community testing during the study period were
present within the COG-UK dataset, of which 17 were identi ed as students, 7 as university staff and 26
as HCWs (Figure 1). Of all identi ed SARS-CoV-2 cases from Cambridgeshire (university and community)
during this period, 8.0% were sequenced (Extended Data Figure 1).
SARS-CoV-2 lineages and transmission clusters
Over the 9-week term, 62 Pango lineages were identi ed across the university and community (Figures 2a
and 2c). In the university, 23 Pango lineages were identi ed, and 438/482 (90.9%) cases were from just 4
lineages (B.1.60.7, B.1.177, B.1.36, B.1.177.16), all of which were detected by the second week of term. 12
lineages were only observed after the second week of term and accounted for 6.9% cases. By
comparison, 57 lineages were identi ed in the local community over the same 9-week period. Viral
genomes containing mutations in the spike protein that have been linked to decreased sensitivity to
antibody-mediated immunity or impact viral transmission were observed in the university population; 3
sequences from the B.1.258 lineage containing the N439K mutation and ∆H69/∆V70, 2 cases of B.1.1.7
and its associated mutations12, and 88 cases of B.1.177 with the A222V mutations13.  
In total, 198 putative transmission clusters were de ned by CIVET, including 16 clusters of 2 or more
university members. Only 8 clusters contained 5 or more university members (range 6-337), which
represented 91.3% of all university cases, signifying that the majority of introductions into UoC did not
cause ongoing transmission. To further investigate the largest of these, cluster 1 described below, we
identi ed groups of identical samples (0 SNP differences) which produced 19 additional clusters (a total
of 34 university clusters) for further analysis.
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Determinants of viral spread across the university
To determine transmission dynamics following introduction into the university, we performed a detailed
investigation of the largest genomic cluster (Cluster 1), which accounted for 337/484 (69.6%) sequenced
university cases (Figure 3). This was widely dispersed across the university by the middle of term,
affecting students from 29/31 Colleges, 28 undergraduate courses and 208 households in university
accommodation alone (Figure 4).
Cluster 1 was classi ed as belonging to Pango lineage B.1.160.7. No mutations previously noted to be
associated with increased transmissibility were observed in this lineage compared to other genomes in
the study. Interrogation of the entire COG-UK dataset of samples from 2020 showed that this lineage was
 rst identi ed in the UK on 4th October 2020, in Wales, before becoming predominantly sampled in UoC
(Figure 3b). The B.1.160.7 lineage was not identi ed in the local community until term week 3, suggesting
that the university cases were introduced from outside Cambridgeshire. This was supported by the
median estimate of the time to the most common recent ancestor of cluster 1, in comparison to its most
closely related cluster from Cambridgeshire community isolates of 115 days (C.I. 91-148) prior to the start
of term. Additional analysis with A2B-COVID showed that these sequences were consistent with a single
introduction into the university (Figure 3c).
National and university contact tracing data were used to identify the initial source of dispersion of this
cluster. Ten students from the  rst two weeks of term reported visiting the same nightclub (venue A). Nine
individuals either had an isolate from cluster 1 or (in the event that their sample did not yield a high-
quality sequence) were household contacts of an individual with a sequenced cluster 1 isolate. No
information was available for one student.
Transmission of cluster 1 was sustained from the  rst week of term until a national lockdown was
enforced on 5th November. Students testing positive in the two weeks around lockdown reported common
exposure events predominantly linked to nightclub venues (25/59 (42.4%) of exposures external to the
university reported by 48 students). Venue A, identi ed above as the possible source of dispersion of this
cluster at the start of term, was also the most common venue identi ed in the two weeks around
lockdown (n=16). 9/16 cases had sequences in cluster 1, and a further 5 individuals (where no sequence
was available) were household contacts of sequenced cases in cluster 1 (Extended Data Figure 5).
To determine the impact of lockdown and other control measures within the university, a birth-death
skyline model14 was used to measure changes in the effective reproduction number (Re) within cluster 1.
The model indicated an initial Re at the start of term that was slightly larger than 1, albeit with wide
uncertainty (median 1.11; 95% HPD: 0.24-2.08 on 5th October). Over the next 2 weeks Re continued to rise
(median 1.54; 95% HPD 1-2.22 on 15th October) followed by a subsequent gradual decline over the next 2
weeks (Figure 5a). There was a rise immediately prior to the start of lockdown (median 1.53; 95% HPD
1.24-1.84 on 5th November), followed by a steep decrease thereafter (median 0.25; 95% HPD 0.09-0.44 on
19th November) (Figure 5a), consistent with declining absolute numbers of SARS-CoV-2 infections seen
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during this time (Figure 2c). The model estimated the median effective infectious period for individuals in
the cluster at 2.91 days (95% HPD: 2.38-3.47 days) (Figure 5b). As the model does not explicitly
incorporate an incubation period and assumes that individuals cannot transmit after being sampled, the
effective infectious period represents the mean time from infection until testing positive and assumes
perfect infection control measures thereafter. Estimates of Re and the effective infectious period are
robust to model parameterisations (Extended Data Figures 6 and 7). Sampling proportion estimates
largely overlap with empirical estimates based on the number of positive cases that were sequenced
during each week (Figure 5c). Although sampling proportion estimates are sensitive to the prior
speci cations, Re estimates are unaffected (Extended Data Figure 8).  
Transmission within university households
There was evidence of transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in student accommodation in 18/34 university
clusters. In cluster 1, 169/337 (50.1%) students had a virus genome sequence identical to at least one
other student living in the same or neighbouring household (sub-clusters within 0 SNPs ranging between
2-11 students).
The largest cluster associated with transmission in accommodation was cluster 2 (lineage B.1.36). By
term week 3, this cluster involved 30 students, of which 24 (80%) lived in the same accommodation block
in College A and 4 students lived in 2 separate households in the same college (Extended Data Figure 9).
Interventions from the university, supported by local public health authorities, included isolation of all
households in the main accommodation block and individual screening offered to all students. Half of all
cases in this cluster were diagnosed by asymptomatic screening. No further genomically-related isolates
were identi ed after term-week 3, indicating a successful intervention, and cessation of transmission.
To quantify the importance of household transmission, a Reed-Frost Chain Binomial Model was
employed to estimate the household attack rate. 265 households in which the data were consistent with
only 1 introduction of SARS-CoV-2 were identi ed using A2B-COVID. The per household contact
probability that an infected person passed on the virus to an uninfected individual within the same
household was estimated at 7.8% (95% C.I. 6.9-8.7%).
Further genomic clusters where transmission between household members was implicated are outlined in
supplementary table 1. They follow similar patterns, with groups of cases con ned to a single college not
leading to sustained transmission.
Other transmission routes among university members
In addition to household transmission, there was evidence of viral spread between students in the same
course and year of study in 14/34 genomic clusters, with the highest proportion being students in their
 rst year of study. In cluster 1, 203/337 (60.2%) students had an identical isolate to at least one other
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student studying the same course in the same year (cluster size range 2-14 students). Statistical
modelling using data from cluster 1 across the term showed a bias towards infections being observed in
 rst year students (p-value=0.002) (Extended Data Figure 10, model details in supplementary methods).
Two further small clusters comprise postgraduate students working in the same university department.
However, we were not able to determine the probable location of transmission in most cases: there is
considerable overlap between course and household clusters, as well as complex social and study
networks between students (illustrated in supplementary table 1, for example in clusters 3, 4 and 10). Of
note, 23/34 clusters with 2 or more genomically linked cases in the dataset contained at least one
university member that could not be epidemiologically linked with any other case in their cluster.
The number of SARS-CoV-2 sequences from university staff members were limited in comparison to
students (n=30). There was evidence of transmission between staff members working in the same
department, college or ancillary role in four genomic clusters. Two clusters contained staff members who
shared the same household. There are 8 clusters involving both university staff and students. However,
epidemiological associations between these two groups could only be identi ed in one cluster: a shared
household between a student and staff member working in separate university departments.
Transmission between the university and local community
We next sought to address the degree of transmission between the university and the local community.
Two distinct phylogenetic approaches, shown in  gure 2, demonstrate segregation of the majority of
community and university cases into separate clusters and therefore a lack of substantial cross-
transmission. Of the 198 clusters across the dataset, 29 (14.6%) contained both university and
community cases. Only 6 clusters contained 5 or more university cases and included 3 or more
community cases.
CIVET was run separately with university and hospital (patient and healthcare worker) cases for a
focused phylogenetic analysis of this setting. Associations were identi ed between university and
hospital settings, with 17 clusters involving both university members and either patients or staff. Cluster 1
(69.6% of student cases), contained only 1 patient and 1 healthcare worker with no identi able
epidemiological link to students. The remaining 16 clusters comprised 133 individuals, including 26
patients, 55 hospital staff or their family members and 52 university members (including 18 staff and 15
clinical medical students). The second largest cluster of university members (n=21 university and
hospital cases) included 9 medical students, 5 healthcare workers and 2 patients. Phylogenetically, the
medical students and one of the healthcare workers were closely linked (Extended Data Figure 11) and
analysis of these cases with A2B-COVID con rmed plausible transmission. All 9 medical students were
on clinical rotations at the time of diagnosis of the index case; 7/9 lived in neighbouring households in
the same college and the remaining 2 were named contacts of the index student.  Plausible transmission
events between this group and the other cluster members were refuted using A2B-COVID (Extended Data
Figure 11).
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To further investigate epidemiological associations in clusters involving university members and the local
community, 1243/1455 of the cases sequenced over the sampling period were linked to national contact
tracing data (excluding hospital cases). 219 (17.6%) cases reported 127 common exposure events.
Cluster 1, representing 69.6% of cases within the university, included only 18/976 (1.8%) community
cases; only one community case had a common exposure with a university student, dining at the same
restaurant. No other epidemiological links were identi ed in all other genomic clusters. Transmission
suspected in 19 epidemiologically linked clusters de ned by common exposures was refuted by
phylogenetic variation.
Discussion
We report the  rst comprehensive and integrated epidemiological and genomic analysis of SARS-CoV-2
transmission in a higher education setting. Following a limited number of introductions, the majority of
cases were linked to a single genetic cluster, that was likely to have dispersed across the university
following multiple social gatherings at a nightclub. There was considerable transmission associated with
student accommodation and student courses, but minimal evidence of transmission in departments, or
between students and staff. We observe the great majority of transmissions occur either within the
university or within the local community. Finally, we present evidence demonstrating the e cacy of
university measures and national lockdown in reducing COVID-19 cases.
Nearly 70% of all university cases belonged to one genetic cluster (cluster 1), introduced into the UoC by
the arrival of students and likely forming a single transmission chain. A nightclub was implicated as an
important transmission event at the start of term and again prior to lockdown. This corroborates previous
studies identifying such venues as a risk factor for substantial SARS-CoV-2 transmission15,16. We urge a
cautious approach to access of such venues during a SARS-CoV-2 pandemic, particularly in the context
of a young susceptible student population.
Our data showed a signi cant rise in the effective reproduction number coinciding with the
announcement of a national lockdown on 31st October to begin on 5th November 2020. This supports the
need for a targeted public health campaign to limit higher risk activities prior to the implementation of
socially restrictive measures. National lockdown dramatically reduced transmission, demonstrating both
compliance and an effective control strategy.
Multiple  ndings in this study demonstrate the e cacy of university strategies to control transmission.
First, we highlight a limited number of introductions and low lineage diversity in the university compared
to the surrounding community. While natural extinction of lineages is relatively common17, multiple
genomically diverse clusters may be expected given the congregation of students from across the globe
(international students make up 35% of students in college accommodation11. The lack of diversity may
re ect the impact of robust and widely implemented university infection control measures, such as social
distancing, mask wearing and quarantine of international students at the beginning of term.
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Further, although we have demonstrated that transmission between students in the same
accommodation block is an important factor in the spread of SARS-CoV-2, we report a lower secondary
household attack rate (7.8%) than that identi ed in domestic households (16.6%-21.1%)18,19, a lower than
expected effective infectious period (2.9 days)20, and a successful reduction of the effective reproduction
number in the university to below 1 after an initial rise at the start of term. In multiple clusters,
transmission in student households was successfully interrupted through measures provided by the
university, including rapid case identi cation through asymptomatic screening and the availability of
symptomatic testing, contact tracing and comprehensive support provided by colleges for cases and their
contacts while in isolation. In identifying considerable transmission between students on the same
course, we suggest that further mitigation of viral spread may be obtained by implementing shared
student accommodation based on university courses.
Finally, we observed limited transmission between the university and the local community. The largest
university cluster, accounting for the majority of student infections, was largely phylogenetically distinct
from community cases. Further, epidemiological evidence describing common exposures for community
and university cases was sparse. However, clinical medical students were disproportionately represented
within community clusters. This is an important epidemiological link between secondary care and the
university; we highlight this group as being at-risk for both acquisition and transmission of SARS-CoV-2
and medical students should therefore be prioritised for interventions such as vaccination.
A combination of contact tracing and genomics was instrumental to understanding transmission within
the university and with its surrounding population; we advocate for a combined genomic epidemiological
approach to inform outbreak investigations.
This study has a number of limitations. Incomplete sampling and subsequent sequence  ltering in both
the university and community should be considered when interpreting transmission; the asymptomatic
and active case ascertainment in this study should mitigate this discrepancy. The lower community case
ascertainment may result in unobserved transmission chains. We highlight shared student courses as a
risk factor for transmission; this does not take into account the setting of transmission, i.e. during
educational or social activities.  Finally, the UoC is distinct in its collegiate structure with limited
integration with the community; any generalisation of conclusions should be tempered by the study
setting.
Conclusion
We present the  rst comprehensive integrated epidemiological and genomic evaluation of transmission
of SARS-CoV-2 within a university. The insights gained will inform public policy regarding infection
control measures in higher education settings. We  nd containment of transmission in student
accommodation necessary to mitigate onward propagation. We highlight the importance of targeted
public health measures towards nightclub venues to limit transmission. Critically, these  ndings are likely




The UoC has approximately 23,000 students and 12,600 staff. The university is divided into 31 colleges
and 150 departments, faculties and other institutions. Students belong to a college community, as well as
being members of the university and an academic faculty/department. Colleges provide residential
accommodation for approximately two thirds of students, either on campuses or in off-site housing, and
offer social and sports activities, pastoral and academic support for each individual21. All Colleges have
membership from students across multiple courses. The university is based in the City of Cambridge
(which has an estimated population of 123,90022), in the county of Cambridgeshire (estimated
population 855,796 people in 201923) in the East of England.
Participants and samples
Samples were derived from university symptomatic testing and asymptomatic COVID-19 screening
programmes between October 5 2020 and December 6 2020, covering the full term. Testing for all
symptomatic students and staff was available on weekdays. The asymptomatic screening programme
has been described in detail elsewhere11. In brief, screening was offered on a voluntary basis to all
students residing in accommodation owned or managed by a college or the Cambridge Theological
Federation. In total, 15,561 students were eligible to participate. To optimise testing e ciency, multiple
swabs were pooled into the same tube of viral transport medium at the time of sample collection. Testing
pools varied in size from 1 to 10 students, with each devised to include one or more student households
as far as possible11. In this study, households are de ned as individuals who share a kitchen, bathroom
and/or lounge facilities. The members of any pool testing positive were re-tested using individual
con rmatory PCR tests to con rm the result and identify the positive subject(s) (see supplementary
methods for further details including infection prevention control measures). Only samples from
individuals that were con rmed positive upon the re-testing were used for sequencing.
SARS-CoV-2 strains circulating in the local community were identi ed from the COG-UK dataset for
Cambridgeshire. These data were derived from local community samples from non-hospitalised,
symptomatic individuals, who requested a free diagnostic test via national community testing. Other
samples were derived from patients treated at three Cambridgeshire hospital trusts: Cambridge University
Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust (a teaching hospital providing secondary care services for Cambridge
and the surrounding area as well as tertiary referral services for the East of England and surge capacity
for COVID-19); Royal Papworth Hospital NHS Foundation Trust (specialist heart and lung hospital, also
providing surge capacity for COVID-19); Cambridgeshire and Peterborough NHS Foundation Trust
(provider of community, mental health and learning disability services in Cambridgeshire). Hospital
samples were obtained from both asymptomatic screening and those exhibiting COVID-19 symptoms.




Positive samples from UoC testing with a PCR cycle threshold value ≤33 were selected and sequenced
using the GridION platform (Oxford Nanopore). All Cambridgeshire samples sequenced between 24th
September and 21st December 2020 were included to overlap with the university term. Samples from the
local Cambridgeshire community and hospital cases (described above) were collected as part of national
SARS-CoV-2 testing, and sequenced at one of seventeen COG-UK sequencing sites (further details in
supplementary methods). The samples were prepared using either the ARTIC25 or veSeq26 protocols, and
were sequenced using Illumina or Oxford Nanopore platforms. Genomic data were  ltered to exclude
sequences with >5% ‘N’s and those of spuriously low  le sizes (<29KB). Genomes were aligned with
minimap227 to the Wuhan Hu-1 reference genome (MN908947.3), collected December 2019. All samples
were processed through COVID-CLIMB pipelines28,29.  Protocols are available at https://github.com/COG-
UK.
Phylogenetic analysis
Maximum likelihood phylogenetic trees were estimated using IQ-TREE (version 2.1.2 COVID-edition)30
and rooted using Wuhan Hu-1 (MN908947.3) as an outgroup. The tree was constructed using the GTR+ Γ
substitution model31, as determined by ModelFinder32. Branch support statistics were generated using
the ultrafast bootstrap method33. TempEst34 was used to explore the temporal signal in the data. Trees
were visualised, explored, and labelled with associated metadata using Microreact35 to identify
epidemiological links supported by the genomic data. Speci ed mutations were identi ed using
type_variants (https://github.com/cov-ert/type_variants). Possible transmission clusters were de ned by
extracting phylogenetic neighbourhoods identi ed using the CIVET tool (version 2.1.0) on 2021-01-11
(https://github.com/artic-network/civet). In selected clusters, further evaluation was conducted using
A2B-COVID36. Where indicated, collapsed nodes from trees generated from CIVET were inspected to
visualise data in the context of the COG-UK national database (https://www.cogconsortium.uk/) For
further evaluation of transmission in the largest cluster identi ed by CIVET, pairwise SNP differences
between sequences were determined using SNP-dist (version0.7.0) (https://github.com/tseemann/snp-
dists).
Lineages
Global Pango Lineages37 were assigned to each genome using Pangolin v2.1.6 (https://github.com/cov-
lineages/pangolin) with analyses performed on COVID-CLIMB29 (further details in supplementary
methods).
Molecular clock and phylodynamic analyses
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BEAST v1.10.438 was used to perform a time-scaled phylogenetic analysis using an exponential growth
coalescent treeprior and an HKY+ Γ substitution model including all university and community high-
quality genomes from the study period. As there was a lack of clear temporal signal in our dataset due to
the relatively short time period analysed, the substitution rate was  xed to 1x10-3 substitutions per site
per year (s/s/y) under a strict clock model39 Two chains of 50 million iterations were run independently to
ensure convergence to the correct posterior distribution. Convergence was assessed using Tracer40, and
10% of states were removed to account for burn-in. Finally, a maximum clade credibility (MCC) tree was
generated using TreeAnnotator.
To estimate the effective reproduction number (Re) and infectious period of SARS-CoV-2 over the term, a
dominant clade (representing 69.6% of all university genomes) was selected and all community genome
sequences that cluster with it incorporated, resulting in a total of 354 genomes. A Bayesian birth-death
skyline (BDSKY) model14 was employed using BEAST v2.6 41. An HKY substitution model was used
along with a strict clock model, placing a lognormal prior with mean 1x10-3 s/s/y (in real space) and
standard deviation 0.1 on the clock rate. A lognormal prior with mean 0 and standard deviation 1 was
placed on Re and a Beta prior with 𝛼=5 and 𝛽=5 was placed on the sampling proportion. Re was
parameterised into 20 epochs, equidistantly spaced between the origin time and the most recent
sequence collection date. The sampling proportion was  xed to 0 before the  rst week of term and
estimated for each week thereafter. The rate at which infected patients become non-infectious was
assumed to be constant and a lognormal prior with mean 48.7 years-1 (in real space) and standard
deviation 0.25 was placed on it, resulting in a prior mean effective infectious period between ~5 and ~15
days. To test the robustness of the posterior estimates different parameterisations were used for Re and
the sampling proportion, and the sampling proportion prior was varied. Further details are provided in the
supplementary methods. For all models two chains of 500 million iterations were run independently.
Convergence was assessed using the R-package coda 42, and 10% of states were removed to account for
burn-in. MCC trees were generated using TreeAnnotator.
Household attack rates
A2B-COVID was used to exclude households for which the sequence and epidemiological data were
inconsistent with a single viral introduction to the household. A chain binomial model was then used to
estimate the probability that an infected person transmitted the virus to an uninfected person within the
same household (further details in supplementary methods).
Epidemiological data
University student demographic data were derived from the UoC student electronic record system
CamSIS, and household structure and membership data from the UoC asymptomatic screening
programme. To identify university a liated cases (students and staff) and hospital staff accessing the
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national SARS-CoV-2 testing service, Second Generation Surveillance System (SGSS) and contact-tracing
data provided by NHS Test and Trace (T&T) data were interrogated. Epidemiologically linked ‘common
exposures’ for students, university staff and the local community were identi ed through T&T data.
Common exposures were de ned by T&T as locations or events that two or more people testing positive
for COVID-19 visited in the same two to seven day period before symptom onset or positive test.
Additional contact tracing information was also provided by the UoC COVID helpdesk. These data were
compared with observed phylogenetic clusters to determine potential sources of transmission and
determine the extent of transmission between the university and community.
Epidemiological data from UoC were initially compiled in Microsoft Azure SQL and Excel 2013
(Microsoft) and analysed in STATA 14.2 (College Station, TX, USA).
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Figures
Figure 1
Study cohort and available genome sequences *Includes 14 students identi ed through ad hoc
asymptomatic screening conducted as part of an outbreak investigation by the University of Cambridge
in conjunction with local public health authorities, responding to increased rates of infection in a block of
student accommodation (described in further detail in cluster 2 below). **includes 2 students associated




a: Maximum likelihood tree showing that the majority of lineages from university isolates were distinct
from community isolates. The node leaves (branch tips) show case location and global PANGO lineage is
illustrated in the vertical bar. b: Time-scaled coalescent tree including university members and local
community isolates from study period with visible segregation between the two groups. College a liation
is shown for university members in the second set of vertical columns, highlighting the ‘top nine’ colleges
by cluster 1 prevalence. c: Epidemic curves demonstrating a steeper decline in SARS-CoV-2 cases in the
University of Cambridge (i) compared to the local community (ii), with associated lineages. Only cases
with available genomes are included. University term ran from the week commencing October 5 to the
week commencing November 30. The light blue shaded area re ects a 4-week national lockdown in the
UK, which was associated with a large fall in COVID-19 cases in University students. Speci c lineages
highlighted are the 4 largest lineages within the University (minimum 20 cases over the study period) and
the community (minimum 50 cases over the study period). For (i), weekly individual case ascertainment
for staff and students testing positive for SARS-CoV-2 through both symptomatic and asymptomatic
testing pathways provided at the University of Cambridge is indicated. For (ii), weekly cases with
genomes available from the local community are shown.
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Figure 3
a: Time-scaled phylogenetic tree of largest university cluster (cluster 1) derived from the BDSKY model
implemented in BEAST 2.6 (see Figure 5). The left-sided heatmap is coloured by case location, and the
right-sided heatmap is coloured by student college a liation, highlighting the ‘top nine’ colleges by cluster
1 prevalence. Cluster 1 was widely dispersed across the university with limited transmission into the
community. b: Frequency of Lineage B.1.160.7 (to which cluster 1 belongs) in each region of the UK and
the University of Cambridge. Regions are de ned as ‘Nomenclature of territorial units for statistics’
(NUTS) regions, where the UK has 9 regions. It is visible that the lineage B.1.160.7 was  rst sequenced in
Wales, and then in the neighbouring South West of England, before becoming prevalent within the
University of Cambridge. The lineage remained infrequently detected in the community populating the
wider surrounding region (East Anglia, Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire, and Essex, making up East of
England) throughout the university term. c: A continuous transmission chain of SARS-CoV-2 infections in
cluster 1 commenced with a single introduction. Relationships between individuals in cluster 1 were
calculated within A2B-COVID. Colours denote potential transmission events from the donor (vertical axis)
to the recipient (horizontal axis) that are consistent with transmission 12 or which are borderline
possibilities (yellow). The plot shows that the data are consistent with a continuous transmission chain
of SARS-CoV-2 infections in cluster 1 occurring via a single introduction.
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Figure 4
Demographics of Cluster 1 across the 1st university term. A) Cumulative number of colleges involved in
the cluster. Cases included in this cluster were between a number of colleges early during the university
term. B) Frequency of cases involved in the cluster by course type. C) Frequency of cases involved in the
cluster by year of study.
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Figure 5
A 20-epoch birth-death skyline model shows the effect of local infection control measures and the
national lockdown on the effective reproduction number (Re), and estimates of the mean effective
infectious period as 2.9 (95% HPD=2.4-3.5) days. (A) Re posterior estimates (dark shading=50% HPD;
light shading=95% HPD). The dotted line indicates the start of term and the light blue shaded area the 4-
week national lockdown in the UK, which was associated with a large fall in COVID-19 cases in University
students. The red dashed line indicates Re=1. (B) Effective infectious period posterior estimates (shaded
region=95% HPD; dashed line=median). (C) Weekly sampling proportion posterior estimates (dark
shading=50% HPD; light shading=95% HPD). The red dashed line indicates the empirical sampling
proportion estimates for each week in term (number of sequenced genomes from all University clusters
divided by the number of positive tests among University staff and students).
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